LUC MICHEL’S
GEOPOLITICAL DAILY
Introduction à la géopolitique de
l'impérialisme britannique
Luc Michel
Mardi 20 mars 2018
RÉSUMÉ FRANÇAIS :
L’impérialisme
britannique est aujourd’hui surtout une
nostalgie de grandeur géopolitique. Mais
différente de celles des autres
petit-nationalismes européens – France,
Allemagne, Pologne ou Roumanie – parce
que l’impérialisme anglo-saxon a un
héritier direct, l’impérialisme
américain. La thalassocratie de
Washington et Wall-street ayant succédé
entre 1917 et 1945 à la puissance
maritime de Londres. Les deux versions
modernes de Carthage. Avec le Brexit,
qui a été soutenu par les mêmes réseaux
qui ont porté Trump au pouvoir, la
relation privilégiée entre Londres et
les USA s’est rénovée. Voilà un
impérialisme britannique 2.0. Nous
allons l’analyser dans une série
d’analyses.
Mais en guise d’introduction, nous
allons tout d’abord examiner comment la
géopolitique vue des USA envisage le
rôle de Londres, ses rapports avec le
continent européen et ses rapports avec
Washington. George Friedman (l’ex patron
de Stratfor, qui dirige aujourd’hui ‘Geopolitical
Future’) vient de publier « The
Geopolitics of Britain ».
Il explique comment "Le problème
fondamental pour la Grande-Bretagne a
toujours été l'Europe continentale. Le
danger pour la Grande-Bretagne était
qu'une entité unique et puissante
surgisse qui pourrait faire deux choses.
Premièrement, il pourrait s'allier avec
l'élite écossaise pour faire la guerre
contre l'Angleterre sur terre.
Deuxièmement, il pourrait construire une
force navale qui pourrait vaincre la
marine britannique et débarquer une
force d'invasion le long de la côte
anglaise de la Manche. Les Romains l'ont
fait, tout comme les Normands. Des
puissances successives surgirent en
Europe qui voyaient une opportunité de
vaincre l'Angleterre et plus tard la
Grande-Bretagne. Les Espagnols ont tenté
une invasion au 16ème siècle; les
Français au 19ème siècle; les Allemands
au 20ème siècle. Chacun a été vaincu par
les eaux traîtresses et la Royal Navy.
Beaucoup d'autres invasions potentielles
n'ont jamais été lancées parce que les
marines n'existaient pas. Ils
n'existaient pas à cause de la grande
stratégie britannique, dont le noyau
était que la masse continentale la plus
proche, l'Europe continentale, placerait
toujours la Grande-Bretagne à un
désavantage démographique dans une
guerre. La population de l'Europe était
la base des armées beaucoup plus grande
que celle que la Grande-Bretagne pouvait
aligner. Par conséquent, la stratégie
centrale était d'empêcher une telle
force d'atterrir en Grande-Bretagne.
(...) Grande stratégie britannique,
donc, est de maintenir une grande force
navale, mais au-delà, de faire ce
qu'elle peut sur le continent européen
pour décourager l'hégémonie sur le
continent en empêchant la formation de
coalitions ou en suscitant des
rivalités. En d'autres termes, la grande
stratégie britannique était une
implication constante sur le continent
européen, avec pour objectif principal
de détourner toute nation se concentrant
sur le développement naval. Ces actions
pourraient impliquer une politique
commerciale, soutenant diverses
dynasties ou nations, utilisant la
capacité de bloquer, ou insérant des
forces terrestres limitées pour soutenir
une coalition de forces. La stratégie
britannique était un kaléidoscope
interminable de tactiques ...
"
Après 1945, le rôle géopolitique de
Londres au sein de l’impérialisme
anglo-saxon, dont Washington avait pris
la tête, a été d’être un porte-avion
américain face à l’Europe. Puis, lorsque
le général de Gaulle (opposé à l’entrée
de Londres dans la CCE, comme le
géopoliticien Jean Thiriart) s’était
retiré du pouvoir, la Grande-Bretagne
était devenue un Cheval de Troie
américain au sein de la CEE, devenue
ensuite UE. Avec le Brexit, voilà
Londres redevenue porte-avion US. Et en
confrontation avec la puissance
continentale réémergente, laRussie de
Poutine …
# LUC MICHEL’S
GEOPOLITICAL DAILY/
INTRODUCTION TO THE GEOPOLITICS OF
BRITISH IMPERIALISM
LUC MICHEL (ЛЮК
МИШЕЛЬ) & EODE/
Luc MICHEL
pour EODE/
Quotidien géopolitique –
Geopolitical Daily/
2018 02 16/
“The fundamental problem for Britain has
always been continental Europe”
- George Friedman ('Geopolitical
Future').
"Being taught by the enemy is an honor
and a duty"
- General Karl
Hausofer (1869-1946),
the geopolitician of
the "Continental Blocks".
British imperialism today is above all a
nostalgia for geopolitical greatness.
But different from those of other
European petty-nationalisms - France,
Germany, Poland or Romania - because
Anglo-Saxon imperialism has a direct
heir, American imperialism. The
thalassocracy of Washington and Wall
Street having succeeded between 1917 and
1945 to the maritime power of London.
Both modern versions of Carthage. With
the Brexit, which was supported by the
same networks that brought Trump to
power, the privileged relationship
between London and the US has been
revitalized. This is a British
imperialism 2.0. We will analyze it in a
series of analyzes.
But by way of introduction, we will
first examine how Geopolitics seen from
the USA view the role of London, its
relations with the European continent
and its relationship with Washington.
George Friedman (the former boss of
Stratfor, who now heads 'Geopolitical
Future') has just published “The
Geopolitics of Britain.”
He explains how “The fundamental problem
for Britain has always been continental
Europe. The danger to Britain was that a
single, powerful entity would arise that
could do two things. First, it could
ally with the Scottish elite to wage war
against England on land. Second, it
could build a naval force that could
defeat the British navy and land an
invading force along the English shore
of the Channel. The Romans did this, as
did the Normans. Successive powers arose
in Europe that saw an opportunity to
defeat England and later Britain. The
Spaniards attempted an invasion in the
16th century; the French in the 19th
century; the Germans in the 20th
century. Each was defeated by
treacherous waters and the Royal Navy.
Many other potential invasions were
never launched because the navies didn’t
exist. They didn’t exist because of the
British grand strategy, the core of
which was that the nearest landmass,
continental Europe, would always place
Britain at a demographic disadvantage in
a war. The population of Europe was the
base of armies vastly larger than that
which Britain could field. Therefore,
the central strategy was to prevent such
a force from landing in Britain Britain
(...) British grand strategy, therefore,
is to maintain a large naval force, but
beyond that, to do what it can on the
European continent to discourage
hegemony on the mainland by preventing
coalitions from forming, or by fomenting
rivalries. In other words, the British
grand strategy was constant involvement
on the European continent, with the
primary goal of diverting any nation
focusing on naval development. These
actions could involve trade policy,
supporting various dynasties or nations,
using the ability to blockade, or
inserting limited ground forces to
support a coalition of forces. British
strategy was an endless kaleidoscope of
tactics ...”
After 1945, the geopolitical role of
London within Anglo-Saxon imperialism,
which Washington had taken the lead, was
to be an American aircraft carrier
against Europe. Then, when General de
Gaulle (opposed to the entry of London
in the CEC, like the geopolitician of
“Greater-Europe” Jean Thiriart) had
withdrawn from power, Britain had become
an American Trojan horse within the EEC,
become then EU. With the Brexit, this is
London again a US aircraft carrier. And
in confrontation with the re-emerging
continental power, Putin's Russia ...
LUC MICHEL (ЛЮК МИШЕЛЬ) & EODE
# DOCUMENT:
THE GEOPOLITICS OF BRITAIN
BY GEORGE FRIEDMAN (MAR 14, 2018)
Excerpt 1:
“THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR BRITAIN HAS
ALWAYS BEEN CONTINENTAL EUROPE. THE
DANGER TO BRITAIN WAS THAT A SINGLE,
POWERFUL ENTITY WOULD ARISE”
“The fundamental problem for Britain has
always been continental Europe. The
danger to Britain was that a single,
powerful entity would arise that could
do two things. First, it could ally with
the Scottish elite to wage war against
England on land. Second, it could build
a naval force that could defeat the
British navy and land an invading force
along the English shore of the Channel.
The Romans did this, as did the Normans.
Successive powers arose in Europe that
saw an opportunity to defeat England and
later Britain. The Spaniards attempted
an invasion in the 16th century; the
French in the 19th century; the Germans
in the 20th century. Each was defeated
by treacherous waters and the Royal
Navy. Many other potential invasions
were never launched because the navies
didn’t exist. They didn’t exist because
of the British grand strategy, the core
of which was that the nearest landmass,
continental Europe, would always place
Britain at a demographic disadvantage in
a war. The population of Europe was the
base of armies vastly larger than that
which Britain could field. Therefore,
the central strategy was to prevent such
a force from landing in Britain (...)
British grand strategy, therefore, is to
maintain a large naval force, but beyond
that, to do what it can on the European
continent to discourage hegemony on the
mainland by preventing coalitions from
forming, or by fomenting rivalries. In
other words, the British grand strategy
was constant involvement on the European
continent, with the primary goal of
diverting any nation focusing on naval
development. These actions could involve
trade policy, supporting various
dynasties or nations, using the ability
to blockade, or inserting limited ground
forces to support a coalition of forces.
British strategy was an endless
kaleidoscope of tactics ...”
Excerpt 2:
“BUILDING A NAVAL FORCE ABLE TO
CHALLENGE THE BRITISH WAS ENORMOUSLY
EXPENSIVE”
“Building a naval force able to
challenge the British was enormously
expensive. Only a very wealthy country
could afford it, but very wealthy
countries lacked the appetite. Other
countries, seeking to increase their
wealth, competed with other aspiring
countries, diverting resources to
land-based forces and making it
impossible to build navies. The fact
that the continent was fragmented first
between kings and emperors, and later
between nation-states, was Britain’s
primary line of defense. The wealthiest
nations were constantly fending off
attacks from neighbors, while the poorer
countries plotted strategies for
enhancing their position through war. As
a result, there were a succession of
great continental powers: Spain, the
Netherlands, France and Germany. None
was strong enough for long enough to
divert resources to taking Britain.”
Excerpt 3:
“THE GRAND STRATEGY”
“British grand strategy, therefore, is
to maintain a large naval force, but
beyond that, to do what it can on the
European continent to discourage
hegemony on the mainland by preventing
coalitions from forming, or by fomenting
rivalries. In other words, the British
grand strategy was constant involvement
on the European continent, with the
primary goal of diverting any nation
focusing on naval development. These
actions could involve trade policy,
supporting various dynasties or nations,
using the ability to blockade, or
inserting limited ground forces to
support a coalition of forces. British
strategy was an endless kaleidoscope of
tactics, constantly shifting
relationships and actions designed to
secure the homeland by maintaining
insecurity on the continent. Britain
didn’t create insecurity. That was built
into the continental geopolitical
system. Britain was successful at taking
advantage of and nurturing the
insecurity that was already there.
Britain was always part of Europe, as
for example its participation in the
Napoleonic wars and the Congress of
Vienna. At the same time, it stood apart
from Europe because its geography gave
Britain another base on which to stand.”
Excerpt 4:
“THE BRITISH EMPIRE CAME INTO BEING AS A
BYPRODUCT OF THIS GRAND STRATEGY”
“The British Empire came into being as a
byproduct of this grand strategy. The
various imperial naval powers that came
into existence were undermined not by
naval force but by land conflicts.
Spain, the Netherlands and France all
developed navies able to carve out
empires. But diversions on the continent
limited their ability to expand those
empires, and drained their ability to
exploit them effectively. The British,
united after the early 18th century and
impervious to European manipulation,
were able to sustain an imperial
enterprise that constantly expanded and
enriched Britain.
The reality of Europe also facilitated
British leadership in the Industrial
Revolution. Continental manpower,
resources and inventiveness were no less
than those of the British. But the
British had far greater security for
their enterprises, less diversion to
military production, and a dynamic and
growing empire to support
industrialization. As a result, Britain
developed another powerful tool for
managing the continent: exports of
manufactured goods and technologies.
What ultimately undermined the British
grand strategy was the unification of
Germany and the rise of the United
States. German unification created an
industrial force that could rival
Britain commercially and dominate the
continent militarily. In World War I,
Britain followed a strategy that flowed
from its grand strategy, intervening
with ground forces to block Germany from
imposing a continental hegemony. The
cost to Britain far outweighed
expectations. The grand strategy failed
Britain by forcing it into a vast land
war on the continent, taking away the
option of selective involvement and
manipulation. Britain had to use main
force, which negated its geographic
advantage.
Excerpt 5:
“THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES”
“Also weakening Britain was the
emergence of the United States as a
power that could field a million men in
Europe and create a naval force that was
second only to Britain’s. The truce that
ended World War I did not end Britain’s
problems; it merely delayed them. Within
two decades, a re-emergent Germany once
again challenged for European hegemony,
and Britain’s survival become dependent
on the intervention of the United
States. In exchange for U.S. support in
World War II, Britain all but gave up
its empire when it was forced to abandon
almost all of its naval bases in the
Western Hemisphere in exchange for
lend-lease. Having been trapped twice in
the one thing she could not do — a
European land war — Britain emerged
hostage to the United States, now a
junior member of its anti-Soviet
coalition (...) The United States then
took on the British role on a global
basis. Britain was no longer the chess
master, but a piece on the board — an
important piece, but one that had lost
its room for maneuver. Britain had to
craft a new grand strategy out of the
wreckage of the old. There was, however,
a core that remained in place, which was
the doctrine of the balance of power.
Now, instead of being the major
balancing power among other nations,
Britain sought to balance its own power
between two more powerful entities: the
United States and the Soviet Union.”
Excerpt 6 :
“CRAFTING A NEW STRATEGY”
“Because of its new position, Britain
did not have the option of isolation.
Its economic system required access to
markets and products, and its strategic
position required leverage on the
European continent. So in 1973, Britain
joined the European Economic Community,
and in 1991 agreed to join the European
Union. Britain always resisted full
integration into the EU, however. In the
era after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, there were two poles for British
strategy: Europe and the United States.
Total dependence on either one could
lead to disaster. Europe was led by its
old nemesis Germany. The United States
was a nemesis as well. Only by having
relations with both could Britain hope
to retain room for its own maneuver. The
two wanted different things. The EU
wanted a defined economic relationship
with elements of a political one. The
United States was open to economic
relationship but particularly wanted
British participation in its wars.
Britain could satisfy both, cling to
both poles and thereby find its own
space.”
Excerpt 7:
“THE BRITISH DILEMMA”
“The problem that Britain faces now is a
European Union that doesn’t resemble
what the founders imagined, or what
existed 10 years ago. Where it had been
seen as becoming a pillar of the
international system along with the
United States, it has morphed into
political discord and uncertainty. The
United States also has internal problems
that were unexpected, but not of the
consequence of Europe’s
Britain’s problem now is being drawn too
deeply into dependency on the United
States. Such dependency on any country
is rarely in a nation’s interest. What
Brexit represents is Britain’s distrust
of the viability of the European system
and a desire to operate independently of
it. That is difficult for Britain to do,
so the United States is the pole that
attracts, if total independence of all
coalitions is not an option — which it
is not.
This is the British dilemma. The German
geopolitical imperative for expansion
and the American need to dominate the
North Atlantic have taken the old
geopolitical reality and radically
shifted its grand strategy. Europe is
moving toward its historic disunity and
class hostility. But Britain is not in a
position to manipulate that for its own
security. The North Atlantic is no
longer Britain’s path to an empire.
Depending on Europe is difficult.
Relying on the United States is
possible, but the U.S. is likely to once
again exact a price. What that price is,
however, is unclear.
Excerpt 8:
“THE ONLY OTHER ALTERNATIVE IS FOR
BRITAIN TO TRY TO LEAD AN ALTERNATIVE
ECONOMIC BLOCK OUT OF THE TRAIN WRECK OF
EUROPE”
The only other alternative is for
Britain to try to lead an alternative
economic block out of the train wreck of
Europe. As Europe’s second-largest
economy, this is not an impossibility.
But in the end, Britain is an island,
and Scotland is restless. The Germans
are united and not altogether
predictable. The U.S. is both friendly
and avaricious, and its tastes are
fickle. Finding a balance between
Europe, however fragmented, and the
United States might seem to be best
option, but geopolitics tends to force
unexpected choices on countries. Who in
1900 would have thought that Britain
would be facing the choice it is facing
today. Only those who understood what
Germany was and what the United States
was going to become.
(The post “The Geopolitics of Britain”
appeared first on ‘Geopolitical
Futures’)
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